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Chapter 12
Virtual Reality
Derek Stanovsky
Introduction
“Virtual reality” (or VR) is a strangely oxy-
moronic term. “Virtual,” with its sense of “not
actual” is jarringly juxtaposed with “reality” and
its opposing sense of “actual.” Undoubtedly the
term has gained such currency at least partly
because of this intriguing provocation. “Virtual
reality” is currently used to describe an increas-
ingly wide array of computer-generated or medi-
ated environments, experiences and activities
ranging from the near ubiquity of video games, to
emerging technologies such as tele-immersion,
to technologies still only dreamed of in science
fiction and only encountered in the novels of
William Gibson or Orson Scott Card, on the
Holodeck of television’s Star Trek, or at the
movies in The Matrix of the Wachowski brothers,
where existing VR technologies make possible a
narrative about imagined VR technologies. The
term “virtual reality” covers all of this vast, and
still rapidly expanding, terrain.
“Metaphysics” too is an expansive term (see
for example Chapter 11, ONTOLOGY, and Chapter
13, THE PHYSICS OF INFORMATION). Setting itself
the enormous task of investigating the funda-
mental nature of being, metaphysics inquires into
what principles may underlie and structure all of
reality. Some questions about virtual reality from
the perspective of metaphysics might be: What
sort of reality is virtual reality? Does the advent
of virtual reality mark an extension, revision,
expansion, or addition to reality? That is, is virtual
reality real? Or is virtual reality more virtual than
real and, thus, not a significant new metaphys-
ical problem itself ? How else might the links
between “reality” and “virtuality” be understood
and negotiated? Perhaps even more importantly,
do the possible metaphysical challenges presented
by virtual reality necessitate any changes in exist-
ing metaphysical views, or shed any light on other
metaphysical problems?
This chapter approaches some of these ques-
tions, focusing on three main issues within the
tremendously open field of inquiry laying at the
intersection of metaphysics with virtual reality.
First, the technology of virtual reality, along with
some of the issues arising from this technology,
will be situated and examined within the Western
philosophical tradition of metaphysics stretching
from ancient to modern and postmodern times.
Next, the issues raised by virtual reality for per-
sonal identity and the subject will be explored and
examined, beginning with Cartesian subjectivity
and moving through poststructuralist theories of
the subject and their various implications for vir-
tual reality. Finally, these metaphysical considera-
tions and speculations will be brought to bear
on the current economic realities of globalization
and the emerging information economy, which
have become inextricably bound up with both
Derek Stanovsky
168
the metaphysics and politics of virtual reality as
it exists today.
Since metaphysics itself is one of the broadest
subjects, it seems odd to restrict the discussion
of virtual reality only to one of its narrower
senses. Therefore, virtual reality too will be con-
strued as broadly as possible, and not confined
to any one particular technological implementa-
tion, either existing or imagined. However, the
insights concerning virtual reality gleaned in this
manner should also find application in many
of its narrower and more restricted domains as
well. One final qualification: since metaphysics
inquires into the fundamental structures of reality,
and since it is unclear at this stage how virtual
reality is to be located within reality, it might
be more appropriate if the present inquiry into
the metaphysics of virtual reality were described
instead as an exercise in “virtual metaphysics.”
It may be that what virtual reality requires is
not so much a place within the history of West-
ern metaphysics as it does a metaphysics all of
its own.
Virtual Reality
Virtual reality has been described in a variety of
ways. In one of the earliest book-length treat-
ments of virtual reality, Howard Rheingold writes:
“One way to see VR is as a magical window
onto other worlds . . . Another way to see VR is
to recognize that in the closing decades of the
twentieth century, reality is disappearing behind
a screen” (Rheingold 1991: 19). This framing
of virtual reality is a useful one for our purposes
in that it helps to clarify and highlight one of
the central issues at stake. Does virtual reality
provide us with new ways to augment, enhance,
and experience reality, or does it undermine and
threaten that reality? Virtual reality is equally
prone to portrayals as either the bearer of bright
utopian possibilities or dark dystopian nightmares,
and both of these views have some basis to re-
commend them. Before exploring these issues
further, it will be helpful to describe and explain
the origins of virtual reality, what virtual reality
is currently, and what it may become in the
future.
Virtual reality emerged from an unlikely hybrid
of technologies developed for use by the military
and aerospace industries, Hollywood, and the
computer industry, and was created within con-
texts ranging from the cold war to science
fiction’s cyberpunk subculture. The earliest forms
of virtual reality were developed as flight simu-
lators used by the US military and NASA to train
pilots. This technology led to the head-mounted
displays and virtual cockpit environments used
by today’s fighter pilots to control actual aircraft.
Another source of VR lies in the entertainment
industry’s search for ever more realistic movie
experiences beginning with the early Cinerama,
stereo sound, and 3D movies, and leading to
further innovations in the production of realistic
images and audio. Add to this a whole host
of developments in computer technology. For
instance, computer-aided design programs, such
as AutoCAD, made it possible to use computers
to render and manipulate three-dimensional rep-
resentations of objects, and graphical computer
interfaces pioneered by Xerox and popularized
by Apple and Microsoft have all but replaced
text-based computer interfaces and transformed
the way people interact with computers. All of
these trends and technologies conspired to
create the technology that has come to be known
as “virtual reality” (for more on the genesis
and genealogy of VR see Rheingold 1991 and
Chesher 1994).
There is not, or at least not yet, any fixed set
of criteria clearly defining virtual reality. In his
book The Metaphysics of Virtual Reality, Michael
Heim identifies a series of “divergent concepts
currently guiding VR research” each of which
“have built camps that fervently disagree as to
what constitutes virtual reality” (Heim 1993:
110). The cluster of features considered in this
section concern computer-generated simulations
which are interactive, which may be capable of
being shared by multiple users, may provide fully
realistic sensory immersion, and which may allow
for forms of telepresence enabling users to com-
municate, act, and interact over great distances.
Although not all of these elements exist in every
version of virtual reality, taken together, these
features have come to characterize virtual reality.
At one end of the spectrum, technologies
allowing interactions with any representation or
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simulation generated by means of a computer
are capable of being described as virtual reality.
Thus, a video game simulation of Kung-Fu
fighting, or the icons representing “documents”
on a simulated computer “desktop” might both
be cases where computers create a virtual reality
with which people then interact in a variety of
ways. What makes these candidates for virtual
reality is not simply the fact that they are repres-
entations of reality. Paintings, photographs, tele-
vision, and film also represent reality. Computer
representations are different because people are
able to interact with them in ways that resemble
their interactions with the genuine articles. In
short, people can make the computer simulations
do things. This is something that does not hap-
pen with other forms of representation. This form
of virtual reality can already be provided by
existing computer technologies and is becoming
increasingly commonplace.
At the other end of the spectrum lie tech-
nologies aimed at fuller sensory immersion.
Head-mounted displays, datagloves, and other
equipment translate body, eye, and hand move-
ments into computer input and provide visual,
audio, and even tactile feedback to the user. This
type of virtual reality aims at being able to pro-
duce and reproduce every aspect of our sensory
world, with users interacting with virtual reality
in many of the same ways they interact with
reality, e.g. through looking, talking, listening,
touching, moving, etc. (even tasting and smell-
ing may find homes in virtual reality one day).
Virtual reality in this vein aims at creating simu-
lations that are not only perceptually real in how
they look and sound, but also haptically and
proprioceptively real in how they feel to users as
well. As Randal Walser, a developer of virtual-
reality systems, has written: “Print and radio tell;
stage and screen show,” while virtual reality
“embodies” (quoted in Rheingold 1991: 192). At
the imagined limit of such systems lie the virtual-
reality machines of science fiction, with Star Trek’s
Holodeck and the computer-generated world of
The Matrix producing virtual realities that are
perceptually and experientially indistinguishable
from reality. No such technology exists today,
but some elements of it are already possible.
In addition to the virtual reality of interactive
simulations, whether confined to two-dimensional
video screens, or realized through more ambi-
tiously realistic and robustly immersive technolo-
gies, there are other elements that may also play
a part in virtual reality. Perhaps the most import-
ant of these is provided by the capability of com-
puters to be networked so that multiple users
can share a virtual reality and experience and
interact with its simulations simultaneously. The
possibility for virtual reality to be a shared experi-
ence is one of the principal features by which
virtual reality can be distinguished from fantasy.
One of the tests of reality is that it be available
intersubjectively. Thus, what is unreal about
fantasy is not necessarily that the imagined experi-
ences do not exist; it is that they do not exist
for anyone else. Dreams are private experiences.
On the contrary, the shared availability of virtual
reality makes possible what William Gibson de-
scribes so vividly in his early cyberpunk novels of
a computer-generated “consensual hallucination”
(Gibson 1984: 51). The ability to share virtual
reality sets the stage for a wide variety of human
interactions to be transplanted into virtual reality,
and opens opportunities for whole new avenues
of human activity. Communication, art, politics,
romance, and even sex and violence are all hu-
man activities that have found new homes in
virtual reality. The possibility for the creation of
entirely new forms of human interactions and
practices that have no analog or precedence out-
side of virtual reality always remains open.
Another feature that may be encountered in
virtual reality is that of “telepresence” or presence
at distance, now frequently shortened simply to
“presence.” E-mail, video conferencing, distance
education, and even telephones, all enable types
of telepresence. In each of these cases, the tech-
nology allows users to communicate with distant
people as if they were in the physical presence of
each other. Such communication is so common-
place in so much of the world today, it hardly
seems strange anymore that it is possible to com-
municate with people who are thousands of miles
away. More sophisticated, realistic, and immersive
technologies both exist, and can be imagined,
that allow not only for written or spoken com-
munication over great distances, but also for
other types of interactions as well. For instance,
the military use of remotely controlled aircraft
and missiles, or the use of unmanned spacecraft
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for exploration where humans might see, move,
control, and use instruments to explore far-flung
destinations in the solar system are both examples
which allow human presence virtually. Other ex-
amples can be found in medicine, where surger-
ies are now performed via computer-controlled
instruments, and surgeons interface with a video
screen rather than a patient. These examples
illustrate ways in which human presence, action,
and interaction can be created virtually, and such
examples are becoming more, rather than less,
common.
Virtual reality not only creates new virtual
spaces to inhabit and explore, but creates the
possibility of virtual time as well. With the cre-
ation of computer-generated simulations came
a bifurcation of time such that one now needs
to distinguish between time in the simulated,
virtual world and time in the rest of the world.
Thus, only with the advent of the artificially
created worlds of virtual reality does the concept
of “real time” (RT) enter into general parlance.
Communications and interactions in virtual real-
ity (as opposed to IRL, “in real life”) may be
synchronous (as in video-conferencing and
chatrooms) and coincide closely with real time,
or asynchronous (as in e-mail exchanges) and
diverge widely and unpredictably from the pas-
sage of time in other virtual interactions or with
time outside the simulation. Time may even stop,
or go backwards, within virtual reality. For in-
stance, a simulation might be paused indefinitely,
or reset to some previous state to allow users to
experience a part of a simulation again. Time
may also vary simply as a result of the techno-
logy used. This might happen when faster ma-
chines are networked with computers operating
at lower MHz, or utilizing slower modems. In
such cases, this can mean that some objects are
rendered faster and changed and updated more
frequently than others, giving an oddly disjointed
sense of time, as objects in the same simulation
move at distinctly different rates of time. These
variations and complications in time emerge
alongside and with virtual reality.
Not all of these elements exist in every ver-
sion of virtual reality. However, taken together,
they provide the background against which cur-
rent virtual-reality systems are being invented and
reinvented. These same elements also trace the
horizon within which any metaphysics of virtual
reality must take place.
Virtual Metaphysics
It is possible to recapitulate a large portion of the
history of Western metaphysics from the vantage-
point offered by virtual reality. The debates over
rationalism, empiricism, realism, idealism, mater-
ialism, nominalism, phenomenology, possible
worlds, supervenience, space, and time, to name
just a few, can all find new purchase, as well as
some new twists, in this brave new world of
computer-generated virtual reality. This section
traces some of the most influential Western meta-
physical views concerning the distinction between
appearance and reality and explores their pos-
sible relevance to virtual reality. This discussion
by no means exhausts the metaphysical possib-
ilities of virtual reality. In addition to the many
strands of Western (henceforth this qualification
will be omitted) metaphysics left untouched,
there remain vast areas of metaphysical thought
that could also be fruitfully explored, including
long and rich traditions of African, Chinese,
Indian, and Latin American metaphysics.
Distinguishing between appearance and reality
is perhaps one of the most basic tasks of meta-
physics, and one of the oldest, dating back at
least to Thales and his pronouncement that de-
spite the dizzying variety in how things appear,
in reality “All is water.” This desire to penetrate
behind the appearances and arrive at the things
themselves is one of the most persistent threads
in metaphysics. Virtual reality presses at the very
limits of the metaphysical imagination and fur-
ther tangles and troubles long standing prob-
lems concerning how things seem versus how
they really are. For instance, puzzles concerning
mirrors and dreams and the ways in which they
can confound our understanding of reality have
a long history and haunt the writings of many
metaphysicians. Virtual reality complicates these
puzzles still further.
“But suppose the reflections on the mirror
remaining and the mirror itself not seen, we
would never doubt the solid reality of all that
appears” (III. 6 [13]). This passage from Plotinus
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comes wonderfully close to describing the cur-
rent possibilities of virtual reality. Virtual reality
may be very like the images in a mirror persist-
ing even after the mirror disappears. In the case
of mirrors, such a possibility remains only hypo-
thetical. Plotinus assumes that in most cases the
difference between reality and the reflection of
reality presented by a mirror is easy to discern.
After all, it is only Lewis Carroll’s Alice who peers
into a looking glass and takes what she sees to
be a room “just the same as our drawing-room,
only the things go the other way” (Carroll 1871:
141). Such a confusion seems amusingly child-
ish and naive. So confident is Plotinus in this
distinction between real objects and their unreal
mirror images that he uses it as an analogy in
support of his claim that reality lies with form
rather than matter. However, what is more strik-
ing is that Plotinus allows that under certain
circumstances (if the image in the mirror endured,
and if the mirror itself was not visible) these
reflections might fool us as well. Indeed, it is
our inability to distinguish image from reality
that lends interest to such spectacles as fun
houses, with their halls of mirrors, and the illu-
sions performed by magicians. In these cases,
we do make the same mistake as Alice. It is this
possibility of fundamentally conflating image, or
representation, with reality that lends mirrors
their metaphysical interest.
Virtual reality may present us with a new sort
of mirror; one with the potential to surpass even
the finest optical mirrors. If so, then virtual real-
ity may fatally complicate the usual mechanisms
used to distinguish image from reality, and
representation from what is represented. For
Plotinus, it is the limitations of the mirror image
that reveals its status as a reflection of reality. It
is only because images in a mirror are transient
(fleeting, temporary, failing to persist over time
or cohere with the rest of our perceptions) and
because the mirror itself does not remain invis-
ible (its boundaries glimpsed, or reflecting sur-
face flawed or otherwise directly perceptible) that
enables us to tell the difference between image
and reality. One of the inherent limitations of
any mirror is that it is necessarily confined to
optical representations. Reaching out to touch
an object in a mirror always reveals the decep-
tion. However, in immersive versions of virtual
reality, the image need not be limited to sight.
In virtual reality, the representation may pass
scrutiny from any angle using any sense. As for
transience, while the images in virtual reality may
disappear at any moment, they also may be just
as permanent and long-lived as any real object
or event. Moreover, mirrors can only reflect the
images of already existing things. Virtual reality
has no such constraint. Objects in virtual reality
may be copies of other things, but they also may
be their own unique, individual, authentic objects
existing nowhere else. This last point means that
the grounds for needing to distinguish image
from reality have changed. It is not simply that
the representations of virtual reality are false (not
genuine) like the reflections in a mirror. It is not
even analogous to Plato’s view of theater, which
was to be banned from his Republic because of
its distortions and misrepresentations of reality.
Instead, virtual reality may summon up a whole
new reality, existing without reference to an
external reality, and requiring its own internal
methods of distinguishing true from false, what
is genuine or authentic from what is spurious
or inauthentic.
Dreams too can provide occasions where
perception and reality become interestingly
entangled and may be one of the best, and most
familiar, comparisons for virtual reality. Dreams
possess many (although not all) of the elements
of virtual reality. Dreams are immersive, match-
ing in sensory clarity and distinctness even the
most optimistic science fiction accounts of
virtual reality. In his Meditations, Descartes fam-
ously entertains the possibility that there may
be no certain method for distinguishing dreams
from reality. He writes: “How often, asleep at
night, am I convinced of just such familiar events
– that I am here in my dressing gown, sitting
by the fire – when in fact I am lying undressed
in bed!” and finds such anecdotes sufficiently
persuasive to conclude that “I see plainly that
there are never any sure signs by means of which
being awake can be distinguished from being
asleep” (Descartes 1641: 77). Here, Descartes
seems to suggest that dreams and reality can
actually be confused, unlike Plotinus, who
viewed the confusion of images in a mirror with
reality as only a hypothetical possibility at best.
Descartes, however, is unwilling to allow this
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much uncertainty into his philosophical system
and so appends the following curious solution
to the dream problem in the last paragraph of
his last Meditation. “But when I distinctly see
where things come from and where and when
they come to me, and when I can connect my
perceptions of them with the whole of the rest
of my life without a break, then I am quite cer-
tain that when I encounter these things I am
not asleep but awake” (Descartes 1641: 122).
Along with clarity and distinctness, Descartes adds
coherence as a final criterion for certainty, in an
effort to resolve the doubts raised by the dream
problem. This is despite the fact that one of the
chief strengths of the dream problem, as he put
it forward, lay in the fact that dreams often could
be fit coherently into waking life.
Virtual reality also can pass these tests of clar-
ity, distinctness, and coherence. Beyond this, VR,
unlike a dream, is able to satisfy the requirement
of intersubjective availability that only “real”
reality is generally assumed to possess. That is,
whereas a dream can only be experienced by a
single person, virtual reality is available to any-
one. At this point, Descartes’s dream problem
takes on new life. Just as was true of the com-
parison with images in a mirror, the need to
distinguish virtual reality from nonvirtual reality
seems to dissolve. If virtual reality is not “real,”
it must be on some basis other than those con-
sidered so far. Distinguishing dream from real-
ity, for Descartes, just like distinguishing image
from reality for Plotinus, takes on importance
precisely because, without some reliable means
of discrimination, such confusions run the risk
of infecting an otherwise easily recognized real-
ity with instances of unreality. This would render
reality a concept of dubious usefulness, for it
could no longer clearly be distinguished from
its opposite, from the unreal, from appearance,
from image, or from dream. Descartes and
Plotinus both identify permanence and coher-
ence as criteria of the real and transience as the
mark of the merely apparent. However, such
solutions work even less well in the case of
virtual reality. At this point the name “virtual
reality” starts to become justified. Virtual reality
takes on an existence with a distinctly different
character from dreams, images, and other mere
representations.
Other metaphysical systems plot more subtle
and complex relationships between appearance
and reality. Kantian metaphysics occupies a pivotal
place in the history of metaphysics providing, as
it does, a continuation of important strands of
debate from antiquity, the culmination of sev-
eral disputes within the modern period, and the
origin of many contemporary discussions in the
field. Can the Kantian system help provide a
more sophisticated description of the status of
virtual reality?
Kant’s transcendental idealism revolves around
the view that things in themselves are unknowable
in principle and that human knowledge is only
of appearances. Just like Descartes, Kant holds
that we are epistemically acquainted with only
our own perceptions. However, unlike Descartes,
for Kant perceptual objects are nothing other
than these patterns of representation encountered
by the mind. Thus, Kant believes it is possible to
overcome the epistemological problems intro-
duced by the division between appearance and
reality. This is because, for Kant, the mind plays
an active, constitutive role in structuring reality.
Chief among these contributions are the intui-
tions of space and time. Space and time are not
themselves “things” that are directly perceptible,
and yet, it is impossible for human beings to
experience objects outside of space and time.
What this means, according to Kant, is that “Both
space and time . . . are to be found only in us”
(1781: A 373). In this way, Kant hopes to over-
come the epistemological divide between em-
piricism and rationalism by restricting knowledge
to objects of experience, while at the same time
granting an active role to the mind in structur-
ing that experience.
Given a Kantian view, the objects encoun-
tered in virtual reality may not pose any signific-
antly new metaphysical challenges. Since things
in themselves are never the direct objects of
human knowledge, the fact that experiences
in virtual reality fail to correspond to objects
outside the mind in any simple, straightforward
way is not necessarily a problem. Every object of
human knowledge, whether actual or virtual, is
nothing other than just such an organized col-
lection of perceptual representations. This means
that virtual reality can be admitted to the world
of empirical human experience on more or less
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equal footing with the more usual forms of
experience. Another way of stating this might
be that, for Kant, all experience is essentially
virtual. It is not epistemic contact with, or know-
ledge of, things as they exist apart from the mind
that ever characterizes any human experience.
What is known is only how those things appear
to the mind. Given this, the fact that virtual
reality exists for the mind (and can be made to
exist for more than one mind) is sufficient to
qualify those experiences as “real.” One may still
need to exercise some care in using and applying
the empirical knowledge gained by way of vir-
tual reality. Likewise, inferences based on that
knowledge must be confined to their appropri-
ate domain. However, this holds true for any
piece of empirical knowledge no matter how it
is acquired.
Kantian metaphysics may also help explain why
human interactions with computers have con-
jured up these strange new frontiers of virtual
space and virtual time. If it is true, as Kant con-
jectures, that the mind cannot experience things
outside of space and time, then any new experi-
ences will also have to be fit within these schemas.
Although the mind does not possess innate ideas
or any other particular content, it does provide
a formal structure that makes possible any ex-
perience of the world. Presumably, this remains
true of computer-generated worlds as well. Once
computer-mediated experiences become a tech-
nical possibility, the mind also structures, organ-
izes, and interprets these experiences within the
necessary framework. Thus, virtual reality may
be a predictable artifact of the mind’s ordering
of these computer-generated experiences. Virtual
space and virtual time may be the necessary
forms of apprehension of virtual reality, just as
space and time are necessary to the apprehension
of reality. In the case of virtual reality, the claim
that space and time are “found only in us” seems
much less contentious. Given these possibilities
and connections, virtual reality may turn out
to provide a laboratory for the exploration of
Kantian metaphysics.
At this point one may wish to retreat to the
relative safety of a more thoroughgoing materi-
alism, where what is real is only the circuits
and wires that actually produce virtual reality.
However, the cost of such a move comes at the
expense of the reality of all experience. It is not
just Descartes and Kant who find a need to
accord an increased status to ideas and percep-
tion. Even in Heidegger’s existentialist meta-
physics there is always not only the object, but
also the encounter of the object; and these two
moments remain distinct, and distinctly import-
ant. This experiential aspect of virtual reality is
something that invites a more phenomenolo-
gically oriented approach. It may be tempting
to see virtual reality as a vindication of Platonist
metaphysics, where the world of ideas is brought
to fruition and the less-than-perfect world of
bodies and matter can be left behind. Others
argue that rather than demonstrating the truth
of Platonic idealism, or marking the completion
of the Cartesian project of separating the mind
from the body, virtual reality instead illustrates
the inseparability of mind from body and the
importance of embodiment for all forms of
human experience and knowledge. After all, even
in the noncorporeal world of virtual reality,
virtual bodies had to be imported, re-created,
and imposed in order to allow for human
interaction with this new virtual world. This
tends to point to the necessity of embodiment
as a precondition for, rather than an impedi-
ment to, experience and knowledge (see Heidt
1999).
There are many other possible approaches
to the metaphysics of VR. For instance, Jean
Baudrillard’s theories of simulation and hyper-
reality seem readymade for virtual reality, point-
ing to a metaphysics where contemporary social
reality could be understood as having already
fallen prey to the order of simulation made
increasingly available by virtual reality. From
Baudrillard’s vantage-point, simulations, like
those of VR, mark the end of our ability to dis-
tinguish between appearance and reality, reduc-
ing everything to a depthless hyperreality (see
Baudrillard 1983). Another possibility would be
to follow Jacques Derrida’s critique of the meta-
physics of presence onto the terrain of virtual
reality where the absence of presence could be
marked in new, high-tech ways. However, rather
than pursuing additional examples, at this point
it is better to inquire into a different, although
closely related, set of metaphysical problems con-
cerning the identity of the self.
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Virtual Identity
In addition to raising questions about the nature
and status of external reality, virtual reality also
raises difficult questions concerning the nature
of the subject, or self. Despite the differences in
the metaphysical views discussed up to this point,
there is one area of general agreement. Whether
Platonist, Cartesian, or Kantian in orientation,
in all of these systems there is a shared notion of
a unified, and unifying, subject whose existence
provides a ground for knowledge, action, and
personal identity. Such a conception of the sub-
ject has been complicated in recent years. In
particular, poststructuralist accounts of a divided
and contingent subject have raised questions
about the adequacy of previous views. Virtual
reality also complicates assumptions concerning
a unified subject. The example discussed above
of images in a mirror can be used again to ap-
proach these questions surrounding the subject,
this time through the work of Jacques Lacan.
Lacan’s influential formulation of the “mirror
stage” pushes the notion of the knowing subject
to its limits. Inverting traditional Cartesian epi-
stemology, the subject, instead of being the first
and most surely known thing, becomes the first
misrecognized and misknown thing. This is an
even more radical mistake than that made by
Alice in her trip through the looking glass. At
least when Alice looked in the mirror and saw
a girl very much like herself, she still took it to
be a different little girl and not herself. For
Descartes, this would amount to a mistake in
the one thing he thought he could be certain of,
the cogito. Given Lacan’s view, “I think, there-
fore I am” becomes an occasion for error when
pronounced while looking into a mirror. In this
case, the I of thinking can differ from the I of
existing (the I of consciousness thinks, therefore
the I in the mirror exists). Lacan reworks the
slogan to read, “I think where I am not, there-
fore I am where I do not think” (Lacan 1977:
166). Such a formulation could never serve as
Descartes’s foundation for knowledge once this
division is introduced within the subject.
This divide within the subject is precisely what
is highlighted in Lacan’s discussion of the mirror
stage. Lacan writes: “We have only to understand
the mirror stage as an identification, in the full
sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the
transformation that takes place in the subject
when he assumes an image” (Lacan 1977: 2).
The subject is thus produced by an identifica-
tion with an image, an image that is not the
subject and yet which is mistaken to be identical
with it. If identity is based on identifications,
and identification is always an identification with
something one is not, then one’s identity will
always be something that is at odds with itself.
Elsewhere, Lacan explicitly relies on an example
of a trick done with mirrors to illustrate the
situation of the human subject. Here, the illu-
sion of a vase filled with flowers is produced.
For Lacan, it is the illusion of the self that is
produced. (See figure 12.1.)
In the figure, the subject occupies the posi-
tion of the viewer (symbolized by a barred S to
re-emphasize this division which founds the sub-
ject), and the ego is represented by the virtual
image of the inverted vase seen in the mirror.
Lacan is proposing that a mistake worse than
that made by Alice with the looking glass is not
merely commonplace, but constitutive of human
subjectivity. The self, emerging over time as the
result of a series of identifications with others,
is, like the image of the vase in the mirror, not
actual but virtual.
Virtual reality compounds this dilemma. If in
reality the subject is already not where it thinks
itself to be, in virtual reality the situation becomes
even worse. Virtual reality provides an open field
for various and even multiple identities and iden-
tifications. In virtual environments, people are
not confined to any one stable unifying subject
position, but can adopt multiple identities (either
serially or simultaneously). From the graphical
avatars adopted to represent users in virtual en-
vironments, to the handles used in chatrooms,
to something as simple as multiple e-mail ac-
counts, all of these can be used to produce and
maintain virtual identities. Identity in virtual
reality becomes even more malleable than in real
life, and can be as genuine and constitutive of
the self as the latter. Sexual and racial identities
can be altered, edited, fabricated, or set aside
entirely. Identities can be ongoing, or adopted
only temporarily. Thus, virtual reality opens the
possibility not only of recreating space and time,
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Figure 12.1: The illusion of a vase/the illusion of the self (Lacan 1978)
Source: “Diagram on p. 145,” from The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psycho-analysis by Jacques Lacan, tr. Alan Sheridan.
Copyright © 1973 by Editions du Seuil. English tr. copyright © 1977 by Alan Sheridan. Used by permission of W. W. Norton
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but the self as well. The subject is produced
anew as it comes to occupy this new space. In
her influential book Life on the Screen, Sherry
Turkle argues that online identities make “the
Gallic abstractions” of French theorists like Lacan
“more concrete,” writing: “In my computer-
mediated worlds, the self is multiple, fluid, and
constituted in interaction with machine connec-
tions; it is made and transformed by language”
(Turkle 1995: 15). For Turkle, the divisions and
fragmentations that mark every identity take on
new prominence and find new uses in the virtual
reality of online society.
Economic Reality
The metaphysics of virtual reality may strike some
as the most esoteric of topics, far removed from
everyday life and practical human concerns. How-
ever, metaphysical views often have a surprising
reach and can make their influence felt in unsus-
pected ways. In the case of virtual reality, these
metaphysical attachments are currently in the
process of producing and reshaping vast areas
of our social reality. If virtual reality has yet to
supplant more traditional modes of human in-
teraction with the physical world, with each other,
and even with oneself, there is one arena in
which virtual reality has already made startling
and astonishingly swift inroads, and that is in
the realm of economics. From ATM machines
and electronic transfers to the dot-com boom
and bust, global capital has not been shy about
leaping into the virtual world of e-commerce.
Why has global capital been able to find a home
in this new virtual economic space with such
ease and rapidity? What does this colonization
of virtual reality portend for other noncommodity
possibilities of virtual reality?
Globalization is a process that has certainly
been facilitated by the information economy of
the digital age. Mark Poster has described this
situation as “Capitalism’s linguistic turn” as the
industrial economy segued into the information
economy (Poster 2001: 39). Capital has been
instrumental in producing and disseminating the
technologies that have made this process pos-
sible. The coining of the phrase “virtual reality”
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is most often attributed to Jaron Lanier, a devel-
oper and entrepreneur of virtual-reality systems,
to use as part of a marketing strategy for his
software company. The potential of e-mail as an
advertising medium was pioneered early on when,
in 1994, a pair of enterprising green-card attor-
neys became the first to use e-mail as a form of
direct marketing. Computer sales, driven by the
expansion of the internet, fueled the expansion
of the high-tech economy to such an extent that
the internet service provider America Online
could afford to buy media giant Time Warner.
Virtual reality has created new commodities,
which have quickly become new economic real-
ities. Capital has also tended to transplant and
reproduce already existing social and economic
inequalities into this new virtual world. For in-
stance, there has been much discussion of the
“digital divide” between those with access to
global information networks and those without.
This divide falls along the well-worn demarca-
tions of race and gender, but even more starkly,
along class lines. The divide between rich and
poor, both within and between nations, has been
mapped onto the very foundations of the informa-
tion age. These capitalist origins of virtual reality
should not be forgotten.
Capital organizes economic and social life
around the production and consumption of com-
modities. Marx writes that the commodity form
raises a whole host of “metaphysical subtleties
and theological niceties” (Marx 1867: 163).
Relationships between commodities become
“dazzling” in their variety and movements, while
the social relationships between producers and
consumers become obscured behind the appear-
ances of wages and prices (Marx 1867: 139).
For Marx, the value of a commodity only emerges
virtually. The value of one commodity finds ex-
pression only in the body of another commodity
through the relationship of exchange. Thus, the
value of a watch might be expressed in its ex-
change for a cellphone. This system of exchange
finds its culmination in money, a commodity
whose function is to provide a mirror for the
value of every other commodity. The particular
commodity serving as money changes over time,
from gold and silver to paper and plastic, as
money asymptotically approaches the perfect mir-
ror described by Plotinus, where only the image
remains and the mirror disappears. The current
electronic transfer of funds around the globe
comes close to realizing this goal (for a further
discussion of “digital gold” in the information
age, see Floridi 1999: 113ff ). It may be that
this spectral nature of money means that capital
is uniquely adapted for virtual reality. Money is
already the virtual expression of value.
For capital, the additional “metaphysical sub-
tleties” tacked on by virtual reality may scarcely
matter. The already virtual existence of money
has facilitated the migration of capital into vir-
tual reality with nothing lost in the transition.
The online virtual reality of the internet was once
home to a variety of small, but close-knit, virtual
communities. This has changed. Now the char-
acter and function of the internet more closely
resembles a virtual shopping mall as advertise-
ments appear everywhere and the identity of con-
sumer overtakes every other online identity. We
may currently be living through a process of
virtual primitive accumulation, or a kind of elec-
tronic enclosure movement, as the free associ-
ation and utopian possibilities offered by online
virtual reality are driven out by the commodi-
fication imposed by global capital. Capital, long
a kind of universal solvent for social relations, is
currently transforming the virtual social relations
of online life at a breathtaking pace. However,
this process does not occur without active resist-
ance (see Chesher 1994, and Dyer-Witheford
1999). It is here that the urgency of these other-
wise abstract metaphysical speculations can be
felt. The metaphysics of virtual reality provides
the horizon on which a host of new ethical and
political questions will take shape and within
which they must be answered.
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